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ENERGY AS A HUMAN RIGHT IN ARMED 
CONFLICT: A QUESTION OF UNIVERSAL 
NEED, SURVIVAL, AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
Jenny Sin-hang Ngai* 
It was never the people who complained of the universality of human 
rights, nor did the people consider human rights as a Western or 
Northern imposition. It was often their leaders who did so. –Kofi Annan1 
INTRODUCTION 
his Article sets out to examine the individual’s entitlement to ac-
cess modern energy services in one of the most complex and per-
vasive long-lasting problems facing human existence today: armed con-
flict. In exploring the role of energy in realizing basic human needs, this 
Article will show how energy is at the center of human survival and de-
velopment. A substantial part of the discussion will be dedicated to the 
merits of recognizing access to energy as a human right and its implica-
tions on the international obligations of States. This analysis will exam-
ine the existing norms concerning energy under international humanitari-
an law and human rights law, as well as emerging international practice 
in support of a case for energy rights. It will then attempt to identify the 
content of the right and the legal obligations it entails. Finally, conclud-
ing remarks will be delivered on the status of the right to energy as a 
universal human right, its applicability in armed conflict, future chal-
lenges, and recommendations for the way forward. 
I. THE WORLD’S ENERGY CRISES – A REALITY CHECK 
Energy as a Privileged Basic Need 
Access to modern energy services, although taken for granted by 
many, still remains an unimaginable luxury to a substantial portion of the 
world’s population.2 One full decade into the twenty-first century, two 
                                                                                                                                     
 *  L.L.B., University of Hong Kong (2009); P.C.L.L., University of Hong Kong 
(2010); M.A.S./L.L.M., Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human 
Rights (2011). I would like to thank Professor Eibe Riedel and Gilles Giacca for their 
inspirations and guidance. 
 1. DOUGLAS A. PHILLIPS, GLOBAL CONNECTIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS 108 (Charles F. 
Gritzner ed., 2009) (quoting Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General). 
 2. For the purposes of this Article, access to modern energy services includes 
household or community access to electricity and clean fuels, which can be used to, inter 
alia, illuminate homes, workplaces, and schools, generate heat for cooking, and power for 
water and sanitation systems. 
T
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billion people—one-third of the world’s entire population—are still 
struggling to survive with no access to electricity.3 While 80 percent of 
these cases occur in rural areas and almost 99 percent of them in devel-
oping countries,4 problems relating to energy also exist in the so-called 
developed countries, where marginalized and underprivileged groups 
suffer from frequent disconnections from energy services due to non-
payment of unaffordable bills.5 It is widely accepted by the international 
community that the lack of access to energy is a major cause of numer-
ous social problems facing the world today, including poverty 6 —a 
                                                                                                                                     
 3. It is further shown that an estimated three billion people across the globe without 
access to sustainable and affordable modern energy. See Ending Energy Poverty, WORLD 
ECON. FORUM (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.weforum.org/sessions/summary/ending-
energy-poverty. 
 4. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP] ET AL., ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT: A POLICY ACTION AGENDA, at 44, U.N. Sales No. E.02.III.B.7 (Thomas 
B. Johansson & Jose Goldemberg eds., 2002). For example, the average electrification 
rate in African is around 26 percent (compared to 60 percent worldwide), meaning almost 
70 percent of the African population have no access to electricity. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], THE AU/NEPAD AFRICAN ACTION PLAN 2010-2015: 
ADVANCING REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 1, 5 (2009), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/32/44326734.pdf; see Grp. of Experts on Global 
Energy Efficiency 21, Recent Developments in the Global Energy Efficiency 21 Project, 
Comm. on Sustainable Energy, Econ. Comm’n for Eur., 
ECE/ENERGY/WP.4/GE.2/2010/2 (Feb. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/energy/se/pdfs/eneff/gee21/gee21_ahge1/ECE.EN
ERGY.WP.4.GE.2.2010.3_e.pdf; see also Energy at the Centre of Africa’s Future 
Growth, BOTSWANA GAZETTE (Jan. 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.gazettebw.com/index.php?view=article&catid=13%3Abusiness&id=5208%3
Aenergy-at-the-centre-of-africas-future-growth-&format=pdf&option=com_content; 
Conference of Energy Ministers of Afr. [CEMA], Energy Infrastructure and Services in 
the Context of Climatic Challenges & Promotion of Investment for Infrastructure Devel-
opment in Africa (Nov. 2010), 
http://www.uneca.org/eca_programmes/development_policy_management/events/Energy
Week2010/AAEW%20Joint%20Ministerial-ECA%20Event%202010-
CONCEPT%20Note-draft4-9-2010.pdf. For the situation in the Asia and the Pacific Re-
gion, see U.N. Econ. & Soc. Comm. for Asia & the Pacific [UNESCAP], Energy Security 
and Sustainable Development in Asia and the Pacific 12 (Apr. 2008), 
http://www.unescap.org/esd/energy/publications/theme_study/themstudy.pdf. 
 5. See Coalition of Belgian Civil Society for Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, Joint 
Parallel Rep. Compliance of Belgium with its Obligations under the ICESCR 5, 18–22 
(2005). 
 6. See generally Rep. of the U.N. World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev., Our Common 
Future, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (1987) [hereinafter Brundtland Report]; Stephen R. Tully, 
The Contribution of Human Rights to Universal Energy Access, 4 N.W. U.J. INT’L HUM. 
RTS. 518 (2006); Adrian Bradbrook & Judith G. Gardam, Placing Access to Energy Ser-
vices within a Human Rights Framework, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 389, 389–90 (2006); Steven 
Humphreys, Keynote Speech at the U.N. Social Forum 2010: Climate Change and Hu-
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“global phenomenon experienced in varying degrees by all States.” 7 
“Energy poverty,”8 or the “absence of sufficient choice in accessing ade-
quate, affordable, reliable, high quality, safe, and environmentally benign 
energy services to support economic and human development,”9 has se-
rious consequences. Not only does it impede development, it also un-
dermines the enjoyment of a wide range of human rights, particularly 
those relating to the improvement of living standards.10 The United Na-
tions Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”), 
in defining poverty, has acknowledged the interrelation between access 
to necessary energy resources, poverty alleviation, and human rights.11 
The impact of this interaction is particularly drastic on the lives and well-
being of the vulnerable groups of society, most notably women and chil-
                                                                                                                                     
man Rights: Crisis and Utopia (Oct. 4–6, 2010), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/poverty/docs/sforum/presentations2010/Humphrey
s.doc. 
 7. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts. [CESCR], Poverty and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ Statement to the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Least Developed Countries, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/10 
(May 10, 2001) [hereinafter CESCR Statement on Poverty]; Bradbrook & Gardam, supra 
note 6, at 392; Stephen R. Tully, The Human Right to Access Electricity, 3 J. GREEN 
BLDG. 2, 143 (2008); see also World Summit on Sustainable Dev. [WSSD], Aug. 26—
Sept. 4, 2002, Plan of Implementation, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20/Corr.1 (Sept. 23, 
2002), available at 
http://www.un.org/jsummit/html/documents/summit_docs/2309_planfinal.htm [hereinaf-
ter WSSD, Plan of Implementation]; UNESCAP, Bali Declaration on Asia-Pacific Per-
spectives on Energy and Sustainable Development 13, U.N. Doc. ST/ESCAP/2130 
(2001), available at http://www.unescap.org/esd/publications/energy/HLR/book.pdf 
(which states that “[a]ccessibility to commercial energy supply is essential for any pro-
gramme of alleviating poverty through the provision of basic minimum human needs.”). 
 8. See ESCOR, Econ. Comm. for Europe, Comm. on Sustainable Energy, Rep. of 
the Group of Experts on Global Energy Efficiency 21, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. 
ECE/ENERGY/WP.4/GE.2/2010/2 (July 22, 2010) [hereinafter GEE21 Report]; see also 
Rep. of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Intergovernmental Grp. of Experts on Energy & Sus-
tainable Dev., Comm. on Sustainable Dev., 8th Sess., Apr. 24–May 5, 2000, ¶¶ 11, 17, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.17/2001/15 (Mar. 27, 2000). 
 9. Amulya K.N. Reddy, Energy and Social Issues, in UNDP, WORLD ENERGY 
ASSESSMENT: ENERGY & THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABILITY 44 (2000) [hereinafter WEA 
2000], available at www.undp.org/energy/activities/wea/drafts-frame.html. 
 10. See, e.g., Rep. of the U.N. Conference on Env’t & Dev., Rio de Janiero, Braz., 
June 3–14, 1992, ¶ 7.46, U.N. Doc. A/CON.151/26 (Vol. I—III), Annex II (Aug. 12, 
1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21]. 
 11. CESCR Statement on Poverty, supra note 7, ¶ 8, where poverty is defined as “a 
human condition characterized by sustained or chronic deprivation of the resources, ca-
pabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate stand-
ard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.” 
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dren in poor, rural areas.12 Women living in areas without adequate ac-
cess to electricity are more likely to develop health problems such as res-
piratory diseases caused by indoor air pollution from burning firewood 
for cooking.13 Children brought up in these deprived areas tend to have 
their educations seriously jeopardized, as they often need to spend long 
hours out of school collecting firewood for the family and, even in their 
scarce free time, are unable to study effectively due to inadequate light-
ing after dark.14 
Energy as the Key to Survival in Armed Conflict 
Deprivation of energy access, which generates countless problems in 
peacetime, can be doubly devastating in the most dangerous of situations 
for human existence—armed conflict.15 Problems with energy access are 
prone to occur more often and on a much greater scale in times of armed 
conflict. Moreover, the lack of energy security during armed conflict can 
significantly undermine the chances of survival of the civilians who, in 
their vulnerable position, are most in need of protection. Electricity-
producing infrastructures are considered to be of generally recognized 
military importance,16  and are targeted for destruction on grounds of 
“military necessity.”17 Disrupting electricity is often considered “time-
crucial” and “vital” to “ensure mission accomplishment,”18 a form of 
                                                                                                                                     
 12. See, e.g., HEIKE MAINHARDT-GIBBS & ELIZABETH BAST, OIL CHANGE INT’L, 
WORLD BANK GROUP ENERGY FINANCING: ENERGY FOR THE POOR? (Oct. 2010), available 
at http://priceofoil.org/educate/resources/energy-for-the-poor. 
 13. Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra note 6, at 538–39. 
 14. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 395. 
 15. See MARCO SASSÒLI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 
209–15 (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, 2d ed. 2006). 
 16. See, for example, the proposed annex to Art. 7(2) of the 1956 New Delhi Draft 
Rules in INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 216–17, ¶ 564 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [here-
inafter Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck], available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-ii-
icrc-eng.pdf. 
 17. See Barton Gellman, Allied Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq; Officials 
Acknowledge Strategy Went Beyond Purely Military Targets, WASH. POST, June 23, 
1991, at A1 (quoting a U.S. Air Force planner saying “We’re not going to tolerate Sad-
dam Hussein or his regime. Fix that and we’ll fix your electricity.”); see also CTR. FOR 
ECON. & SOC. RTS., SPECIAL REPORT: WATER UNDER SIEGE IN IRAQ 5 (Apr. 2003) [herein-
after WATER UNDER SIEGE IN IRAQ], available at 
http://www.cesr.org/downloads/waterundersiege.pdf. 
 18. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 148, 232 (1992). 
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retaliation,19 or can be otherwise classified as “collateral damage.”20 Re-
gardless of the motives, the consequent breakdown of energy services 
threatens the survival of most vulnerable group in any armed conflict, the 
civilian population. For example, it is reported that during the 1991 Gulf 
War, “the vast majority of deaths were caused not by the direct impact of 
bombs but by the destruction of the electric power grid and the ensuing 
collapse of the public health, water and sanitations systems, leading to 
outbreaks of dysentery, cholera, and other water-borne diseases.”21 Simi-
larly, extensive blockades or policies restricting supplies of electricity 
and fuel are not uncommon in occupied territories.22 These have led to 
severe, long-term impacts on the livelihood and well-being of the civilian 
population, as seen in the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
whose supply of electricity is “almost totally dependent on Israel.”23 The 
prolonged fuel shortage and the inability of the local power plant to meet 
the demand of the general population have seriously disrupted the public 
health systems, damaged medical equipment, and impaired the water and 
sanitation systems, thus resulting in water impurities and further public 
health risks.24 In fact, these issues provided the background of to the Fuel 
and Electricity Case brought before the Israeli Supreme Court.25 In up-
holding the decision of Israel to reduce or limit the supply of fuel and 
electricity in the Gaza Strip, the Court relied heavily on the military ne-
                                                                                                                                     
 19. See, e.g., Bassem Mroue, Hezbollah Warns of Retaliation for Any Israeli Hit, 
NASHUA TEL. (Feb. 16, 2010), 
http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/news/worldnation/626395-227/hezbollah-warns-of-
retaliation-for-any-israeli.htm. 
 20. See, e.g., Alexandra Boivin, The Legal Regime Applicable to Targeting Military 
Objectives in the Context of Contemporary Warfar, in RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 24 (Univ. 
Ctr. for Int’l Humanitarian L. No. 2, 2006), available at http://www.adh-
geneve.ch/docs/publications/collection-research-projects/CTR_objectif_militaire.pdf. 
 21. WATER UNDER SIEGE IN IRAQ, supra note 17, at 4. For reports on similar situa-
tions during the Israel attacks on Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006, see also Peter Symonds, 
Amnesty International Details Israeli War Crimes in Lebanon, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB 
SITE (Aug. 25, 2006), http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/aug2006/amne-a25.shtml; Ste-
ve Coll, Afghanistan’s Fate: Healing or Disintegration?, WASH. POST, May 3, 1992, 
cited in Human Rights Watch, Blood-Stained Hands: Past Atrocities in Kabul and Af-
ghanistan’s Legacy of Impunity (2005), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45c2c89f2.html. 
 22. See HCJ 9132/07 Jaber Ahmad et al. v. Minister of Defense [2008] (Isr.) [herein-
after Fuel and Electricity Case]. 
 23. Id. ¶ 12. 
 24. Human Rights Council, Rep. on Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied 
Arab Territories: Rep. of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 
¶¶ 1216–20, 1242, 1248, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009) [hereinafter U.N. 
Palestine Report]. 
 25. Fuel and Electricity Case, supra note 22. 
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cessity of ‘the war on terror’ against Hamas. It also considered that the 
amount of fuel and electricity Israel intended to supply would be “suffi-
cient to meet the [future] vital humanitarian needs”26 of the population on 
the occupied territory. Without delving into the reasoning of the Court, 
this helps illustrate how inadequate access to energy services particularly 
affects people in armed conflict and military occupation, and traditional 
approaches to the existing legal framework may not serve to protect the 
right to energy of the most vulnerable. In humanitarian crises today, what 
one sees and hears is only the tip of the iceberg. One ought not forget 
that countless unnamed individuals have suffered or died in war-torn ter-
ritories from the collapse of essential public services caused by the lack 
of energy access.27 Hence, the question of energy access becomes one of 
survival in times of armed conflict, where the denial of energy needs al-
most certainly leads to the denial of human survival needs. A real need 
has emerged for the individual’s legal entitlement to energy access in 
armed conflict to be the formally recognized. 
II. APPLICABLE LAWS IN ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW VS. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Mutual Complementarity 
Before making a case for the right in detail, it is helpful to examine the 
relations between international human rights law and international hu-
manitarian law. Although “designed to operate primarily in normal 
peacetime conditions” with the state-individual relationship, 28  human 
rights apply “always, everywhere, and to everyone.”29 States are bound 
by their international obligations to protect and preserve human rights 
and fundamental freedoms of the individual “at all times, in war and 
peace alike.” 30  International humanitarian law, capable of regulating 
                                                                                                                                     
 26. Id. ¶ 22. 
 27. One can see this in the gender dimension in the case of Afghan women being 
barred from Kabul hospitals under Taliban policy, where the only establishment women 
could access could barely operate due to the lack of running water and inadequate elec-
tricity. See SASSÒLI & BOUVIER, supra note 15, at 2297–98; S.C. Res. 1193, ¶ 14, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1193 (Aug. 28, 1998). 
 28. Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 45, 74 (Dieter Fleck ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter IHL HANDBOOK]. 
 29. U.N. Secretary-General, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, ¶ 25, U.N. 
Doc. A/8052 (Sept. 18, 1970). 
 30. Rep. of the Int’l Comm. of Inquiry on Darfur to the U.N. Secretary-General pur-
suant to S.C. Res. 1564, ¶ 144 (Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Darfur Report]; see also Int’l 
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power-relationships between all states,31 between the state and the indi-
vidual and among individuals, applies only to situations of armed con-
flict and occupation32—to the exclusion of “internal disturbances and 
tensions.” 33  This makes room for concurrent application of different 
norms to the same situation, such as in a given armed conflict.34 Appli-
cable norms from the two regimes are “complementary, not mutually 
exclusive,” 35  but rather “mutually reinforcing.” 36  This approach, con-
sistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,37 also entails 
that the relevant rules are to be interpreted in light of one another.38 This 
                                                                                                                                     
Conf. on Human Rights, Teheran, Iran, Apr. 22–May 13, 1968, Final Act of the Int’l 
Conf. on Human Rights, Res. XXIII, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.32/41 (May 12, 1968). 
 31. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 79 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Opinion] (citing Corfu Channel 
(U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9)) (where the ICJ held that the rules of humanitarian 
law applicable in armed conflict constitute “intransgressible principles of international 
customary law,” fundamental to the respect of the human person and “elementary consid-
erations of humanity,” which must be observed by all States whether or not they have 
ratified the conventions that contain them.). 
 32. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Person in Time of 
War, arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]; Pro-
tocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Protocol I, art. 1(4), June 8, 1977 
[hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Protocol 
II, art. 1, June 8, 1977 [hereinafter AP II]. 
 33. AP II, supra note 32, art. 1(2). For definitions, see SASSÒLI & BOUVIER, supra 
note 15, at 110 n.32. See also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 
8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute]. 
 34. René Provost, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 
274 (2002). 
 35. U.N. Off. of the High Comm’n for Human Rights [U.N. OHCHR], Human Rights 
Comm., General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed 
on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add/13 (2004) 
[hereinafter General Comment No. 31]; SASSÒLI & BOUVIER, supra note 15, at 341–54; 
Article 75 of the Additional Protocol provides that “[n]o provision of this Article may be 
construed as limiting or infringing any other more favorable provision granting greater 
protection, under any applicable rules of international law.” AP I, supra note 32, art. 
75(8). 
 36. Darfur Report, supra note 30, ¶ 144. The Commission went on in the same para-
graph to consider that Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions “evokes the pro-
tection of human rights law for the human person,” which “in itself applies the duty of 
the state to protect also to situations of armed conflict.” Id. 
 37. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 
I.L.M. 679. Article 31(3)(c) provides that as a general rule of interpretation, “any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties” shall be taken 
into account. Id. 
 38. General Comment No. 31, supra note 35, ¶ 11. 
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has been affirmed in a wide range of authoritative texts and international 
jurisprudence, including the cases before the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: 
[A]ll persons, during internal or international armed conflict, are pro-
tected by the provisions of international human rights law . . . and by 
the specific provisions of international humanitarian law. . . . [T]he 
specificity of the provisions of international humanitarian law that pro-
tect individuals subject to a situation of armed conflict do not prevent 
the convergence and application of the provisions of international hu-
man rights law . . . both parties had the obligation to respect a serious 
of provisions of international law, including those stipulated in interna-
tional human rights law or in international humanitarian law, or in 
both.39 
In its Advisory Opinion concerning the Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Inter-
national Court of Justice (“ICJ”) found that: 
As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and 
human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights 
may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others 
may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be 
matters of both these branches of international law.40 
In short, human rights norms are generally applicable in armed con-
flict, whereas humanitarian law may also be applied by human rights 
organs and treaty bodies.41 Insofar as the case of energy is concerned, it 
arguably falls within the third situation acknowledged by the ICJ to 
which both branches of law are relevant, as energy access is both a hu-
man rights issue at all times and an issue of military objective and of sur-
                                                                                                                                     
 39. Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
¶¶ 112, 117 (Nov. 23, 2004); see also Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimi-
nation on the United States of America, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. CERD/C.USA/CO/6 (2008); 
Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 43 (1995); Bankovic et al. v. Belgium, 
App. No. 52207/99, 333 Eur. Ct. H.R. 57 (2001); Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 209 (Nov. 25, 2000); Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 34 (Feb. 4, 2000); Commission Nationale des Droits de L’Homme et 
des Libertés v. Chad, ¶ 21, Comm. No. 74/62, Afr. Comm. Hum. & Peoples’ Rights 
(1995); Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, ¶ 65, Comm. 
No. 227/99, Afr. Comm. Hum. & Peoples’ Rights (2003). 
 40. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. ¶ 106 (July 6) [hereinafter Wall Opinion] (em-
phasis added). 
 41. Rüdiger Wolfrum & Dieter Fleck, Enforcement of International Humanitarian 
Law, in IHL HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 676, 715. 
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vival of the civilians in armed conflict. The question now turns to the 
interaction between them and the implication for application and en-
forcement of energy as a human right in armed conflict. 
International Humanitarian Law as ‘Lex Specialis’? 
The legal maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali, a generally ac-
cepted technique of interpretation and conflict resolution in international 
law, entails the notion that “whenever two or more norms deal with the 
same subject matter, priority should be given to the norm that is more 
specific.”42 In other words, “law specially tailored to a particular context 
takes precedence over generally applicable law.”43 International humani-
tarian law, historically “conceived of specifically to address the kinds of 
situations which arise in warfare and the dynamics which underpins 
them,”44 is often referred to as lex specialis when placed vis-à-vis con-
currently applicable human rights standards, which are considered lex 
generalis. Notwithstanding this characterization, the applicability of hu-
man rights standards alongside humanitarian law in cases of military oc-
cupation has been well-recognized.45 The ICJ, having affirmed the extra-
territorial applicability of human rights law to Israel regarding the occu-
pied Palestinian territory in its Wall Opinion,46 went on to refer to the 
two applicable branches of law as “namely human rights law and, as lex 
specialis, international humanitarian law.”47 It is not entirely clear how 
the two bodies of norms interrelate in times of armed conflict due to 
some conceptual ambiguities and diverse approaches to the maxim.48 
After an analysis of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
                                                                                                                                     
 42. Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of Internation-
al Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 
[2006] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 2, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/61/10. 
 43. Connor McCarthy, Legal Conclusion or Interpretative Process? Lex Specialis 
and the Applicability of International Human Rights Standards, in INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 101, 101 (2008). 
 44. Id. at 101. 
 45. See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 178–79 (Dec. 19); U.N. OHCHR, Human Rights 
Comm., General Comment No. 6, The Right to Life (art. 6), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1982); CESCR, Concluding Observations of the Comm. on Econ., 
Soc., & Cultural Rights: Isr., ¶ 31, 13th Sess., May 23, 2003, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.90 
(2003). 
 46. Wall Opinion, supra note 40, ¶ 106; General Comment No. 31, supra note 35, ¶ 
10. 
 47. Wall Opinion, supra note 40, ¶¶ 106, 112, 130, 137 (on the ICJ’s finding of hu-
man rights violations on part of Israel); see also Darfur Report, supra note 30, ¶ 143. 
 48. McCarthy, supra note 43, at 101–09. 
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Rights (“ICCPR”)49 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”),50 together with their travaux prépa-
ratoires and relevant state practice, some conclude that in situations of 
armed conflict and military occupation, international humanitarian law is 
to be applied lex specialis to the exclusion of human rights norms: 
[T]he best reading of the interrelationship between the [ICCPR] and in-
ternational humanitarian law is the more traditional view that interna-
tional humanitarian law should be applied as the lex specialis in deter-
mining what a state’s obligations are during armed conflict or military 
occupation.51 
However, such a categorical and conclusory approach is “fundamental-
ly problematic.”52 Given the “multiplicity of interwoven treaty stand-
ards,” customary norms contained in international humanitarian law,53 
and the impossibility to maintain any sharp distinction between human 
rights law and humanitarian law,54 any straightforward assignation of the 
latter as lex specialis would be incomplete and inadequate for the pur-
pose of determining the applicable norms and their interrelation in any 
given case.55 Indeed, this approach has been criticized for its “effect of 
displacement,”56 “superficial simplicity,”57 and its erroneous presumption 
that “specificity is effectiveness.”58 Moreover, it would only be at odds 
with a growing body of authoritative legal determinations which envis-
age some form of concurrent role for generalis and specialis norms, es-
pecially in international humanitarian and human rights law.59 In its Ad-
visory Opinion concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, the ICJ held that the test for a violation of the right to life, 
namely an arbitrary deprivation of life60 “falls to be determined by the 
                                                                                                                                     
 49. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 50. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 51. Michael Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times 
of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 119, 139 (2005); see also 
McCarthy, supra note 43, at 107, 141 (where the same conclusions were made, mutatis 
mutandis, in respect of the ICESCR). 
 52. McCarthy, supra note 43, at 110. 
 53. Id. at 109. 
 54. Id. at 110. 
 55. Id. at 103. 
 56. Id. at 106, 118. 
 57. Id. at 117. 
 58. Id. at 116. 
 59. Id. at 108. 
 60. ICCPR, supra note 49, art. 6(1). 
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applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict 
which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.”61 It is argued 
that one main effect of the lex specialis principle is that “specific rules of 
human rights law are applied by reference to the standards in humanitari-
an law” in areas where they are both applicable.62 Recently, the UN 
Committee against Torture, in rejecting the United States’ categorical lex 
specialis arguments in relation to its detention operations in Guantana-
mo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, reaffirmed this approach: 
[T]he Convention [Against Torture] applies at all times, whether in 
peace, war or armed conflict, in any territory under its jurisdiction and 
that the applicant of the Convention’s provisions are without prejudice 
to the provisions of any other international instrument.63 
Therefore, different legal norms are better viewed as “existing along a 
spectrum of legal relevancy to the factual circumstances at issue,”64 for 
lex specialis applies not to the general relationship between the two 
branches of law, but relates to “specific rules in specific circumstanc-
es.”65 Fundamentally, they cannot address every specific problem in a 
given situation adequately without the complementary application of 
other, perhaps more general, rules that are concurrently applicable. 
Hence, the right question is not whether or a norm is lex specialis per se, 
but rather, which norms are most relevant to a factual context at issue. In 
this case, it is the lack of access to modern energy services and its conse-
quences in armed conflict. 
III. ACCESS TO ENERGY IN ARMED CONFLICT UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 
International Humanitarian Law: Obligations vs. Rights 
Given the interplay of the two fields of law, answering whether the in-
dividual has a legal entitlement, or right, to energy in armed conflict, re-
quires an examination of the relevant norms under both international 
humanitarian and human rights laws. Despite their distinct historical ori-
                                                                                                                                     
 61. Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra note 31, ¶ 25. 
 62. Greenwood, supra note 28, at 45, 74. Article 75 of AP I expressly provides for 
complementarity as to the human right to due process or “fundamental guarantees.” AP I, 
supra note 32, art. 75. 
 63. Concl. & Rec. of the Comm. Against Torture, Comm. Against Torture, 36st Sess., 
May 1–19, 2006, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (2006); see also McCarthy, supra 
note 43, at 108. 
 64. McCarthy, supra note 43, at 110. 
 65. Greenwood, supra note 28, at 75 (emphasis added). 
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gins, differences in codification, and enforcement mechanisms, both 
branches of law serve the same purpose: to protect the individual.66 It is 
argued that a number of rules under international humanitarian law, alt-
hough not formulated in the rights language, are to a large extent analo-
gous to the human rights obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill basic 
human needs. Access to energy services gives rise to both positive and 
negative obligations:67 to refrain from certain methods of combat that 
can result in disruption or deprivation of access, and to provide access.68 
Obligation to Protect Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civil-
ian Population 
In both international and non-international armed conflict, it is general-
ly prohibited to “attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indis-
pensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, 
agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, 
drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.”69 This 
prohibition implicates energy rights, as it has been shown that energy 
access is crucial for the survival of the civilian population.70 Undoubted-
ly, energy is required for the effective operation of, inter alia, the “pro-
duction of foodstuffs,” “drinking water installations and supplies,”71 “ir-
rigation works,” and many other civilian infrastructures. Therefore instal-
lations for electric power, being objects needed to facilitate energy ac-
cess to the civilian population, prima facie fall within the definition of 
“objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.”72 
                                                                                                                                     
 66. See A.H. Robertson, Humanitarian law and Human Rights, in STUDIES AND 
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES: IN HONOUR 
OF JEAN PICTET, 793, 793–802 (1984). 
 67. Although many provisions are formulated in terms of “prohibition,” the titles of 
the relevant articles refer to “protection,” which arguably favors the approach of reading 
into the prohibitory provisions the corresponding positive obligations to respect and pro-
tect the objects at stake. 
 68. See Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 16, at 149–62, 1148–56. 
 69. AP I, supra note 32, art. 54(2) (emphasis added); AP II, supra note 32, art. 14 
(emphasis added). Note that in international armed conflicts, only destruction, removal, 
or rendering useless of these objects for the specific “purpose of depriving the civilian 
population” of them “for their sustenance value” is prohibited, but not if it is the result of 
incidental damage. See Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in IHL HANDBOOK, 
supra note 28, at 129, 218–19. Furthermore, in international armed conflicts, it is prohib-
ited to make these objects “the object of reprisals.” AP I, supra note 32, art. 54(4). 
 70. See supra Part I; see also WATER UNDER SIEGE IN IRAQ, supra note 17. 
 71. See Oeter, supra note 69, at 219 (where the 1991 Operation Desert Storm in Iraq 
was referred as an example of what resulted when the power supply was disturbed). 
 72. Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 16, at 1156, ¶ 267. 
2012] ENERGY AS A HUMAN RIGHT IN CONFLICT 591 
Moreover, these provisions only contain a nonexhaustive list of pro-
tected objects to exemplify what are commonly considered as “objects 
for subsistence.” They may include “objects not directly linked to food 
and water supply” as objects of comparable subsistence values,73 for ex-
ample, clothing and basic shelter.74 As electricity installations are more 
than “indirectly linked,” but rather indispensable, it would only be logi-
cal to include most of the expressly protected objects in the open defini-
tion. Likewise, the prohibition of starvation of the civilian population75 
also implies that energy supply must be adequately ensured, as it is re-
quired for the production, preservation, and processing of foodstuffs and 
pre-treatment for potable water. In other words, there exists an implicit 
obligation on the parties to the conflict to protect energy supply installa-
tions and other objects required to facilitate energy access by refraining 
from attacking, destroying, removing them, or rendering them useless. 
Although exceptions exist in cases where electric energy installations 
are used mainly for military purposes and thereby become “military ob-
jectives,”76 it is also stipulated that “in no event shall actions against the-
se objects be taken which may be expected to leave the civilian popula-
tion with such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force 
its movement.”77 This absolute obligation to spare the civilian popula-
tion, when taken together with the indispensable role of energy supply in 
food provision and water systems, entails an obligation to ensure at least 
some provision of energy services to maintain civilian life. This is a core 
minimum obligation that is closely connected to the absolute prohibition 
of starvation78 and thus can “in no event” be exempt—whether or not the 
installations constitute military objectives.79This does not even apply in 
                                                                                                                                     
 73. See, e.g., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 655, ¶¶ 
2102–03  (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY]; Oeter, supra 
note 69, at 218. 
 74. See, e.g., ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 655, ¶ 2103. 
 75. AP I, supra note 32, art. 54(1); AP II, supra note 32, art. 14. 
 76. These are considered “undisputed ‘military objectives.’” Oeter, supra note 69, at 
184. 
 77. AP I, supra note 32, art. 54(3) (emphasis added). 
 78. Id. art. 54(1); AP II, supra note 32, art. 14. 
 79. “Military objectives” are defined as “objects which by their nature, location, pur-
pose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a 
definite military advantage.” AP I, supra note 32, art. 52. The difficulties and controver-
sies in the distinction between military objectives and civilian objects in the case of ener-
gy supply installations are discussed in Oeter, supra note 69, at 183–85, 219. 
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cases where a party may derogate from the general obligation within a 
territory under its own control.80 
Obligation to Protect ‘Works and Installations Containing Dangerous 
Forces’ 
It is also generally prohibited in all armed conflict to attack “works or 
installations containing dangerous forces” including dams, dykes, and 
“nuclear electrical generating stations” (whether military objectives or 
not), “if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces (such as 
lethal radiation) and consequent severe losses among the civilian popula-
tion.”81 The raison d’être is to “restrict the extent of permissible collat-
eral damage,” as destruction of such infrastructure will lead to the release 
of “uncontrollable forces” that can cause severe damage to the civilian 
population.82 There is also an absolute prohibition to make them the ob-
ject of reprisals,83 as well as the obligation to avoid locating any military 
objectives in their vicinity, in order to minimize the risks of incidental 
attack.84 
Hence, even if the works and installations have clearly become mili-
tary objectives, they may not be attacked unless three cumulative condi-
tions are fulfilled: 1) such attack “cannot cause severe losses among the 
civilian population”;85 2) these “works and installations” provide “regu-
lar, significant and direct support of military operations,” i.e. their total 
or partial destruction offers a definite military advantage in the circum-
stances;86 and 3) such attack is the only “‘feasible way’ to terminate the 
                                                                                                                                     
 80. AP I, supra note 32, art. 54(5); see also General Comment No. 31, supra note 35, 
¶ 10. 
 81. AP I, supra note 32, art. 56(1); AP II, supra note 32, art. 15. 
 82. Oeter, supra note 69, at 221. Note that such prohibition also applies to a Party’s 
own territory under the control of the adverse Party. AP I, supra note 32, art. 49(2). 
However, Article 56 does not prohibit destruction, removal, or being rendered useless of 
these objects by a government or an Occupying Power exercising control over the territo-
ry, unless for military necessity in accordance with Article 53, of GC IV. Id. Article 54 of 
AP I places restrictions on “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian popula-
tion.” Id.; see also ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 669, ¶ 2152; Wall Opinion, 
supra note 40, ¶ 135 (where the ICJ held that the requirement for the exception of abso-
lute military necessity under Art 53, GC IV was not met). 
 83. AP I, supra note 32, art. 56(4). 
 84. Id. art. 56(5). 
 85. Id. art. 56(1). “‘Severe” is equivalent to “important’ or ‘heavy.’” See ICRC 
COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 669, ¶ 2154. 
 86. In the case of nuclear electricity generating stations, it is the support by way of 
providing electric power for military operations. AP I, supra note 32, art. 56(2)(b). For 
dams or dykes, it is the support by their use “for other than its normal function.” Id. art. 
56(2). 
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support,” i.e. there is no other objective the attack of which would be 
permissible and capable of achieving an “equal military advantage.”87 
The level of protection offered by these provisions to power stations is 
rather unclear. In particular, the scope of the notion “regular, significant 
and direct support of military operations” is obscured by the fact that 
most nuclear electrical generating stations are of a multi-purpose nature, 
as they contain integrated electricity power grids that provide electricity 
for both civilian and military uses.88 What is clear is that merely supply-
ing electricity to multiple destinations does not necessarily satisfy this 
notion,89 such that cases where “normal power stations feeding electric 
energy into the normal electricity power grid, despite the fact that mili-
tary installations may also be supplied by the same grid” must fall out-
side of it.90 As far as the access to energy services is concerned, the pro-
tection is further weakened, if not substantially undermined, by the fact 
that attacking electricity lines is recognized as a legally permissible and 
“relatively easy” feasible alternative to direct attacks on the stations.91 
Obligation to Protect the Natural Environment 
The specific obligation to protect the natural environment in armed 
conflict further supports a claim for energy rights. It expressly prohibits 
the use of “methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be 
expected” to cause “widespread, long-term and severe damage” to the 
natural environment.92 It further requires care to be taken to protect the 
natural environment from such damage, 93  while prohibiting attacks 
                                                                                                                                     
 87. Oeter, supra note 69, at 223. 
 88. For general definitions of “regular,” “significant,” and “direct,” see ICRC 
COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 671, ¶¶ 2162–65. For the difficulties and debates, see 
Oeter, supra note 69, at 223–25; MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. 
SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 
PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 399 (1982). 
 89. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 672, ¶ 2165. 
 90. Oeter, supra note 69, at 224–25. Note that the Rapporteur of Committee III also 
acknowledged that the expression “military operations” does not cover the production of 
civilian objects, even if they are also used by the armed forces. Steering Comm. for Hu-
man Rights [CDDH], Official Records, ¶ 91, CDDH/215/Rev/1 (Vol. XV) (1975); ICRC 
COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 672, ¶ 2165. 
 91. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 672, ¶ 2166. 
 92. AP I, supra note 32, arts. 35(3), 55(1); see also Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra 
note 31, ¶ 31; Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 
47/37, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/37 (Nov. 25, 1992) (stating that “destruction of the envi-
ronment, not justified by military necessity and carried out wantonly, is clearly contrary 
to existing international law.”). 
 93. AP I, supra note 32, art. 55(1). 
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against the natural environment “by way of reprisals.”94 This constitutes 
an absolute prohibition against widespread, long-term, and severe envi-
ronmental damage, which, unlike certain acts of hostilities, may not be 
justified even by military necessity.95 It also covers both intentional and 
purely unintentional, so-called incidental infliction of damage, as well as 
damage inflicted to “prejudice the health or survival of the population.”96 
In light of evidence of widespread opinio juris and increasing state prac-
tice, some have argued that equivalent customary norms have emerged 
with regard to, at the very least, the general prohibition against intended, 
manifestly superfluous, damage to the environment.97 
These prohibitions are relevant not only because the relevant UN defi-
nition of severe contains a reference to “serious or significant disruption 
or harm to, human life or natural resources,” 98 but also because compli-
ance with these restrictions on the methods of warfare would have the 
necessary effect of sparing natural energy resources and installations in 
armed conflict.99 Although some have considered the scope of applica-
tion of these provisions restricting methods of combat to be rather lim-
ited,100 and the threshold of the widespread, long-term, and severe too 
                                                                                                                                     
 94. Id. art. 55(2). Likewise, severe manipulation of the environment as a weapon is 
also prohibited under the ENMOD Convention. Convention on the Prohibition of Mili-
tary or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, G.A. Res. 
31/72 Annex (ENMOD), ¶¶ 5–7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/72 (May 18, 1977). However, the 
relationship between the prohibitions in AP I and the ENMOD Convention is not clear-
cut. See Oeter, supra note 69, at 132–33 n.75. 
 95. See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 411–14, ¶¶ 1444–49; Oeter, supra 
note 69, at 132. 
 96. AP I, supra note 32, art. 55(1). 
 97. Oeter, supra note 69, at 134; Comm. established to Review the NATO Bombing 
Campaign against the Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia, Final Rep. to the Prosecutor, ¶ 15, U.N. 
Doc. PR/P.I.S./510-E (June 13, 2000) [hereinafter ICTY Committee Report]. Note the 
possible exception of damage caused by nuclear weapons in Nuclear Weapons Opinion, 
supra note 31, ¶ 33. 
 98. U.N. Comm. on Disarmament, Rep. of the Conference of the Comm. on Dis-
armament, Sept. 21–Dec. 22, 1976, 91, U.N. Doc. A/31/27; GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 
27 (1976). 
 99. For example, “damage to the natural environment” in the conflicts in the Former 
Yugoslavia was considered to include the release of pollutants caused by “attacks on 
industrial facilities such as chemical plants and oil installations.” ICTY Committee Re-
port, supra note 97, ¶ 14. 
 100. The standard of “widespread, long-term and severe damage” has been considered 
by some to limit the application of the provisions to only “very significant damage.” 
ICTY Committee Report, supra note 97, ¶ 15. For example, the ICTY Committee con-
cluded that the “environmental damage caused during the NATO bombing campaign [did 
not] reach the very high Additional Protocol I threshold.” Id. ¶ 17. Similarly, The Balkan 
Task Force was of the view that despite some “environmental hot spots,” contamination, 
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ambiguous,101 it is argued that they are at least capable of protecting nat-
ural energy resources, to the extent that they seek to prohibit severe “in-
terference with human life and natural resources” in international armed 
conflict.102 
Obligation to Protect Civilian Objects 
Protection of civilian objects, while more general, is also relevant to 
the question of energy access as essential to a comprehensive protection 
related to the survival of the civilian population. The core obligation to 
protect civilian objects is based on one of the cornerstones of interna-
tional humanitarian law: the distinction between civilian population and 
objects on the one hand, and military objectives on the other.103 Such a 
fundamental distinction entails the prohibition on indiscriminate at-
tacks104 and requires parties to a conflict to do everything feasible to dis-
tinguish between the two, including verifying whether the objects are 
subject to protection, and “in particular whether they are works and in-
stallations containing dangerous forces.”105 Additionally, customary in-
ternational humanitarian law provides that civilian objects must not be 
made the object of attack or of reprisals, except for such time that they 
become military objectives.106 Even during operations against military 
objectives, parties must also take “constant care” to spare civilian objects 
(as well as civilians and civilian population).107 In case of doubt, there is 
a presumption against treating an object which is “normally dedicated to 
civilian purposes” as military objectives.108 
Civilian objects are defined under customary international humanitari-
an law as “objects which are not military objectives,” whereas “military 
objectives” are “limited to those objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
                                                                                                                                     
and serious pollution detected which posed “a threat to human health,” the damage in 
“the Kosovo conflict has not caused an environmental catastrophe affecting the Balkans 
region as a whole.” Joint UNEP/UNCHS Balkan Task Force, The Kosovo Conflict: Con-
sequences for the Environment and Human Settlements 11 (1999), available at 
http://www.grida.no/inf/news/news99/finalreport.pdf. 
 101. See Oeter, supra note 69, at 133 n.78. 
 102. Id. at 131. 
 103. Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 16, at 17, ¶ 96 & 143, ¶ 59. 
 104. For definitions see AP I, supra note 32, arts. 51(4)–(5). 
 105. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(i); ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 680, ¶ 2194. 
 106. AP I, supra note 32, arts. 48, 52(1). Article 52(1) has now formed part of custom-
ary international humanitarian law. Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 16, at 149–
59. 
 107. AP I, supra note 32, art. 57. 
 108. Id. art. 52(3). 
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whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the cir-
cumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”109 
Although objects commonly used for facilitating access to energy ser-
vices are not expressly referred to as objects normally dedicated to civil-
ian purposes, such as “a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a 
school,”110 the notion of civilian objects is capable of encompassing en-
ergy-related objects like electric energy installations, provided that they 
have not clearly become military objectives such due to predominantly 
military use and effective military contribution. In this sense, the general 
protection of civilian objects can potentially fill in the gaps and protect 
energy-related objects falling outside the categories of specific protected 
objects, such as “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population”111 and “works and installations containing dangerous forc-
es.”112 
Obligation to Protect Property 
Likewise, the prohibition of destruction of property under international 
humanitarian law arguably implies a corresponding obligation to respect 
and protect energy-related property in armed conflict. The Hague Regu-
lations forbid the unnecessary destruction or seizing of any property in 
the territory involved in a war.113 The Fourth Geneva Convention prohib-
its only destruction by the Occupying Power in occupied territory,114 but 
covers “all property (real or personal), whether it is the private property 
of protected persons (owned individually or collectively), State property, 
that of the public authorities (districts, municipalities, provinces, etc.) or 
of co-operative organizations.”115 The broad notion of property for pro-
tection arguably includes energy-related property. It should be noted that 
the possible exceptions of imperative military necessities to both of these 
rules do not take away the applicability of the general prohibition, but 
                                                                                                                                     
 109. Id. art. 52(2); Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 16, at 15, 21–22, 141–47. 
 110. AP I, supra note 32, art. 52(3). 
 111. Id. art. 54(2); AP II, supra note 32, art. 14. 
 112. AP I, supra note 32, art. 56(1); AP II, supra note 32, art. 15. 
 113. The Fourth Hague Convention expresses that it is “especially forbidden” to “de-
stroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of war.” Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land, art. 23(g), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. 
 114. GC IV, supra note 32, art. 53. 
 115. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on Convention (IV) relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, ¶¶ 1–2 (1949) 
[hereinafter ICRC, GC IV Commentary], available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/380-600060?OpenDocument. 
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merely reflect the realities of war: hostilities driven by military ambitions 
and operations. 
War Crimes and Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
The fact that a number of prohibited acts of hostilities against civilian 
objects, property, and the natural environment have been criminalized as 
war crimes (some of which also constitute grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions) falling within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”) and giving rise to individual criminal responsibility fur-
ther reinforces the inference of an individual entitlement to energy access 
in armed conflict. Examples include:116 
 [E]xtensive destruction and appropriation of proper-
ty, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly;117 
 Intentionally directing attacks against civilian ob-
jects, that is, objects which are not military objec-
tives;118 
 Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge 
that such attack will cause incidental . . . damage to 
                                                                                                                                     
 116. Although the actual deterrent effects of these war crimes are somehow uncertain, 
this does not diminish their value as evidence of the will of the international community 
to prohibit certain acts of hostilities, which could have seriously disrupted access to ener-
gy services during armed conflict. See ICTY Committee Report, supra note 97, ¶¶ 20–21; 
see also Thilo Marauhn, Environmental Damage in Times of Armed Conflict – Not ‘Real-
ly’ a Matter of Criminal Responsibility? 840 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 1029, 1029–36  
(2000), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jqtb.htm; Ju-
dith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 
391, 404–10 (1993). 
 117. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Geneva Convention Relative for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 
art. 50, Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Ame-
lioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces 
at Sea, art. 51, Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; GC IV, supra note 32, art. 
147. Cf. Hague Regulations, supra note 113, art. 23(g). See, for example, the separate 
opinion of Judge Elaraby in the Wall Opinion stating: 
Israel has committed grave breaches. The pattern and the magnitude of the vio-
lations committed against the non-combatant civilian population in the ancil-
lary measures associated with constructing the wall, are, in my view, ‘extensive 
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity 
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly’ (Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 
147). 
Wall Opinion, supra note 40, ¶ 3.3 (separate opinion of Judge Elaraby). 
 118. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 8(2)(b)(ii); AP I, supra note 32, arts. 48, 52. 
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civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment which would be 
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
overall military advantage anticipated;119 
 Destroying or seizing the enemy’s property unless 
such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded 
by the necessities of war [in international armed con-
flict]120 (cf. “Destroying or seizing the property of an 
adversary unless such destruction or seizure be im-
peratively demanded by the necessities of the [non-
international] conflict”).121 
Obligation to Provide Accommodation and Food 
Another relevant obligation under international humanitarian law is 
providing protected persons, persons deprived of liberty, and prisoners of 
war with a number of provisions, some of which cannot be fulfilled 
without access to energy services, such as adequate shelter, food, and 
water facilities. Protected persons are persons who “find themselves, in 
case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or 
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.”122 There is a detailed 
obligation incumbent upon the Detaining Power, in interning protected 
persons, to  
[t]ake all necessary and possible measures to ensure that protected per-
sons shall, from the outset of their internment, be accommodated in 
buildings or quarters which afford every possible safeguard as regards 
hygiene and health, and provide efficient protection against the rigours 
of the climate and the effects of the war . . . . The premises shall be ful-
ly protected from dampness, adequately heated and lighted, in particu-
lar between dusk and lights out. The sleeping quarters shall be suffi-
ciently spacious and well ventilated, and the internees shall have suita-
ble bedding and sufficient blankets, account being taken of the climate, 
and the age, sex, and state of health of the internees . . . . They shall be 
provided with sufficient water and soap for their daily personal toilet 
                                                                                                                                     
 119. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 8(2)(b)(iv); AP I, supra note 32, arts. 55, 56, 57. 
Note that this “admits the possibility of lawful . . . collateral damage.” See Customary 
IHL – Section B. Determination of the anticipated military advantage, ICRC, 
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cha_chapter4_rule14_sectionb (last visit-
ed Mar. 21, 2012). 
 120. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 8(2)(b)(xiii). 
 121. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(xii). 
 122. GC IV, supra note 32, art. 4. Note the exceptions for nationals of a non-state par-
ty to the Convention, a neutral state, and a co-belligerent state while their national state 
has “normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are.” Id. 
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and for washing their personal laundry; installations and facilities nec-
essary for this purpose shall be granted to them. Showers or baths shall 
also be available.123 
Despite the absence of an explicit obligation of access to energy ser-
vices for protected persons, the obligation is implicit in a number of the 
express obligations. These include the obligations to “provide efficient 
protection against the rigours of the climate”; ensure the premises to be 
“fully protected from dampness, adequately heated and lighted, in partic-
ular between dusk and lights out”; ensure proper ventilation; take the 
climate into account; and to provide “installations and facilities neces-
sary” for daily water supplies.124 Arguably, none of these concurrent ob-
ligations towards the protected persons can be adequately achieved with-
out access to electricity, implying an obligation to provide access to en-
ergy services (or the benefits of such access). These obligations are like-
wise applicable in non-international armed conflict, where persons who 
are deprived of liberty “for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether 
they are interned or detained” are entitled to “safeguards as regards 
health and hygiene and protection against the rigours of the climate and 
the dangers of the armed conflict.”125 In the prisoner of war context of 
international armed conflict, it is explicitly stated that “[t]he premises 
provided for the use of prisoners of war . . . shall be entirely protected 
from dampness and adequately heated and lighted, in particular between 
dusk and lights out.”126 This obligation is essentially identical to one of 
the specific duties towards protected persons.127 Thus, the same implied 
obligation should apply, mutatis mutandis, to the treatment of prisoners 
of war.128 Such an interpretation of an implied obligation can likewise be 
read into the specific obligation to provide internees and prisoners of war 
with the means by which they can prepare food for themselves.129 
Obligation of Humane Treatment and Medical Care 
In addition to the obligations with respect to detained persons, there is 
an overriding principle of the right to humane treatment of all persons 
hors de combat—“including members of armed forces who have laid 
                                                                                                                                     
 123. Id. art. 85. 
 124. Id. 
 125. AP II, supra note 32, art. 5(1)(b); see also id. art. 4 (“fundamental guarantees”). 
 126. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 
1949, art. 25, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]. 
 127. GC IV, supra note 32, art. 85. 
 128. See infra the right to adequate housing. 
 129. GC IV, supra note 32, art. 89; GC III, supra note 126, art. 26. Cf. the right to food 
discussed below. 
600 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:2 
down their arms, and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, 
detention, or any other cause” in non-international armed conflict,130 
must be “in all circumstances . . . humanely treated . . . without any ad-
verse distinction.”131 That the principles of humanity, inherent to interna-
tional humanitarian law and human rights law, guide all parties, even in 
cases not covered by existing rules is supported by the Martens Clause132 
and the first two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, which 
expressly require protection of all persons in accordance with the princi-
ples of humanity and the “dictates of public conscience.”133 
The obligation to provide medical care and attention to those in need in 
armed conflict, and their respective rights to receive such care, must be 
understood in the context of this important principle.134 It is an obligation 
incumbent on everyone (including members of armed forces and the ci-
vilian population) to respect and protect the “wounded, sick and ship-
wrecked.”135 The infirm must be treated humanely and are entitled to 
receive the medical care and attention required by their condition “to the 
fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay.”136 Likewise, 
persons who are deprived of their liberty137 have the “benefit of medical 
examinations”138 and their “physical or mental health and integrity” must 
not be “endangered by any unjustified act or omission.”139 
                                                                                                                                     
 130. GC IV, supra note 32, art. 3(1). 
 131. Id. art. 3(1); AP I, supra note 32, art. 75(1); AP II, supra note 32, art. 4(1); GC 
IV, supra note 32, art. 27. 
 132. The Martens Clause provides that civilians and combatants remain under the pro-
tection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established cus-
tom, principles of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience even in cases where 
specific international agreements do not apply. See Helmut Strebel, Martens’ Clause, in 3 
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 326–27 (Rudolf Bernhardt 
ed., 1992); Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶ 317, 46th Sess., 2 May–July 22, 1994, U.N. 
Doc. A/49/10; GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1994). 
 133. AP I, supra note 32, art. 1(2); AP II, supra note 32, pmbl. ¶ 4; see also Dieter 
Fleck, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts, in IHL HANDBOOK, supra note 28, 
at 619–20. 
 134. See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 146, ¶ 444. 
 135. See id. at 1408, ¶ 4635. 
 136. AP I, supra note 32, art. 10(1); AP II, supra note 32, art. 7(2). 
 137. Note the exceptions to “protected persons.” ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, 
at 153–54, ¶ 470. 
 138. AP II, supra note 32, art. 5(2)(d). This provision aims to ensure, generally, good 
medical attention in places of internment or detention and that contagious diseases are 
detected in time. Id.; see ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 1391, ¶ 4587. 
 139. AP I supra note 32, art. 11(1); AP II, supra note 32, art. 5(2)(e). “The interpreta-
tion of these two purely humanitarian provisions is identical.” ICRC COMMENTARY, su-
pra note 73, at 1391, ¶ 4588. 
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The prohibition of endangering physical health implicates the obliga-
tion to ensure energy access, because it is crucial for the availability and 
quality of medical care, may disrupt the functioning of the general 
healthcare system, and the lack of access can endanger the physical 
health of those requiring treatment.140 Noting that the examples of pro-
hibited acts in these provisions are subject to further development, “de-
pending on the circumstances and the goodwill of those responsible,”141 
it is imperative that an implied obligation to ensure energy access for 
medical purposes in armed conflict is taken into consideration. 
Similar obligations with regard to medical care can also be read into 
certain rules governing the Occupying Power in occupied territory. One 
obligation is to ensure that “the medical needs of the civilian population 
in occupied territory continue to be satisfied.”142 It is specifically prohib-
ited to requisition resources that are necessary for either “the provision of 
adequate medical services for the civilian population” (such as vaccina-
tion as prophylactic measures) 143 or “for the continuing medical care of 
any wounded and sick already under treatment”144 (such as the heating 
system which arguably forms an integral part of the unit).145 Since elec-
tricity is undoubtedly indispensable to the proper functioning of adequate 
medical services and the provision of medical care, equipment and mate-
rials necessary to facilitate energy access to the medical units are also 
implicitly included and hence cannot be requisitioned. The Occupying 
Power also has the obligation to ensure and maintain the “medical and 
hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the 
occupied territory, with particular reference to the adoption and applica-
tion of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the 
spread of contagious diseases and epidemics.”146 Such measures cannot 
                                                                                                                                     
 140. Since physical health can be endangered by, for example, “allowing a wound to 
become infected through lack of hygiene or care,” it can also be endangered by the non-
provision of energy services for medical purposes, which admittedly lead to more life-
threatening consequences. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 152, ¶¶ 462, 466; see 
supra Energy as the Key to Survival in Armed Conflict, p. 582 and note 21. 
 141. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 1389, ¶ 4581. 
 142. AP I, supra note 32, art. 14(1)–(3). 
 143. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 184–85, ¶ 592(a). 
 144. AP I, supra note 32, art. 14(2). 
 145. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 183, ¶ 587. 
 146. GC IV, supra note 32, art. 56. Examples of these “prophylactic and preventive 
measures” include supervision of public health, education of the general public, the dis-
tribution of medicines, the organization of medical examinations and disinfection, the 
establishment of stocks of medical supplies, the dispatch of medical teams to areas where 
epidemics are raging, the isolation and accommodation in hospitals of people suffering 
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be effective unless there is adequate access to energy services (e.g. for 
hygiene maintenance and vaccine refrigeration) and therefore the same 
implicit obligations exist as to an energy right. 
Obligation to Provide “Supplies Essential to the Survival of the Civilian 
Population”147 
The Occupying Power also has the specific obligation to ensure the 
provision of, inter alia, “means of shelter” and “other supplies essential 
to the survival of the civilian population of the occupied territory,” “to 
the fullest extent of the means available to it and without any adverse 
distinction.”148  This latter phrase designates “a positive, complete re-
quirement on the Occupying Power to use all means available to provide 
the supplies in question” as well as the obligation “to arrange for other 
steps to be taken if it could not supply the requirements in question from 
its own resources or those of the occupied territory.”149 This interpreta-
tion broadens the obligation responsibility of the Occupying Power in the 
sense that mere local resource scarcity cannot constitute a valid excuse 
for inadequate provisions. 
In addition to the obligation to provide food and medical supplies,150 
arguably there is an obligation to provide adequate shelter to the civilian 
population in recognition that it is possible to “suffer, and even die, from 
heat or cold.”151 In order to adequately protect the inhabitants against the 
rigours of the climate, a shelter needs to have access to electricity in 
some form. In fact, as indicated by the word “other,” the list of essential 
supplies in the provision is nonexhaustive and other unmentioned items, 
depending on the local conditions, may fall within the category of “other 
supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population of the occu-
pied territory.”152 It has been suggested that “fuel might be essential in a 
cold region.”153 By analogy, it is argued that supply of electricity and 
supplies essential to the provision of energy services can be read into the 
                                                                                                                                     
from communicable diseases, and the opening of new hospitals and medical centers. See 
ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 314. 
 147. See, e.g., AP II, supra note 32, art. 14 (“Protection of objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population”). 
 148. AP I, supra note 32, art. 6(1) (emphasis added). 
 149. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 812–13, ¶ 2783. 
 150. GC IV, supra note 32, art. 55. 
 151. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 812, ¶ 2779. 
 152. Id. at 812, ¶ 2780. 
 153. Id. 
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category of other supplies, forming part of the obligation.154 It is also 
useful to add that to recognize that particular local conditions may lead to 
different levels of energy needs access does not take away the universali-
ty of the right itself in principle but rather affirms its importance in real-
izing basic, human needs everywhere, albeit to varying extents. 
It is further argued that despite its ruling, the Israeli Supreme Court has 
implicitly recognized the vital importance of electricity service provision 
in situations of armed conflict, including that of an occupied territory, in 
the Fuel and Electricity Case.155 In specifying that the obligation im-
posed on Israel to allow the passage156 of electricity and fuel to the Gaza 
Strip is derived from the “vital humanitarian needs of the residents of the 
civilian population,”157 and in finding that Israel “allows supply of fuel 
and electricity in the amount needed for the vital humanitarian needs in 
the area,”158 the Court implicitly regarded electricity and fuel as essential 
goods. Although the outcome of the case has been criticized for, inter 
alia, the court’s overreliance on the “somewhat vague standard”159 of 
what constitutes vital humanitarian needs, such judicial recognition of 
the importance of energy services bears certain significance.160 
Obligation to Fulfill the Right to Humanitarian Assistance 
The obligation pertaining to the right to humanitarian assistance is of 
particular relevance to the case of energy services, since deprivation of-
ten occurs due to resource scarcity or the apparent inability to provide the 
population within the territory. Hans-Peter Gasser has stated that the ob-
ligation to treat civilians hors de combat humanely “not only means the 
prohibition of certain behaviour but also an obligation to act.”161 The 
general principle is that when the civilian population is inadequately 
supplied with indispensable goods162 as a result of the conflict, they have 
the right to receive humanitarian assistance, i.e. relief actions must be 
                                                                                                                                     
 154. See supra Obligation to Protect Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civil-
ian Population, p. 590–92. 
 155. Fuel and Electricity Case, supra note 22. 
 156. Obligations to allow passage are found in GC IV, supra note 32, arts. 23, 38; AP 
I, supra note 32, art. 70; AP II, supra note 32, art. 18(2); see infra Obligation to Fulfill 
the Right to Humanitarian Assistance. 
 157. Fuel and Electricity Case, supra note 22, ¶ 11. 
 158. Id. ¶ 19. 
 159. U.N. Palestine Report, supra note 24, ¶ 1306. 
 160. Fuel and Electricity Case, supra note 22, ¶¶ 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 17, 21, 22. 
 161. Hans-Peter Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population, in IHL HANDBOOK, 
supra note 28, at 237, 269. 
 162. GC IV, supra note 32, art. 69, and the discussion above. 
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undertaken.163 Closely linked to the obligation to protect “objects indis-
pensable to the survival of the civilian population,”164 the obligation up-
on parties to an armed conflict to allow passage of indispensable goods165 
through the territory under its control is considered to have attained the 
status of customary international humanitarian law,166 binding on even 
non-state parties to the Additional Protocol I. 
In international armed conflict, proposed relief actions for the civilian 
population under the control of an adverse party may be undertaken only 
with the agreement of that adverse party. Likewise, relief actions cannot 
be undertaken to assist the civilian population of a party to an armed con-
flict without the agreement of the other parties to the conflict, i.e. the 
Parties concerned.167 In occupied territory, the Occupying Power is under 
an obligation to accept relief action unless it has other means of meeting 
the essential needs of the civilian population of the occupied territory 
itself.168 Even in the Fuel and Electricity Case, where the provision of 
fuel and electricity by Israel was held to be sufficient,169 the humanitarian 
obligations on Israel to allow “rapid and unimpeded passage” of vital 
humanitarian goods required for the survival of the civilian population to 
the Gaza Strip, and to “refrain from causing intentional injury to humani-
tarian installations” were not disputed.170 In non-international armed con-
flict, relief actions by an impartial and nondiscriminatory humanitarian 
organization to the civilian population that is “suffering undue hardship 
                                                                                                                                     
 163. GC IV, supra note 32, arts. 23, 38; AP I, supra note 32, arts. 70–71; AP II, supra 
note 32, art. 18(2). GC IV imposes an obligation on third states to allow free passage for 
the relief actions. GC IV, supra note 32, arts. 23, 59. Likewise, Article 81 of AP I impos-
es said obligation for “humanitarian initiative” of the ICRC. See generally Gasser, supra 
note 161, at 237, 243–44, 269–70 (on relief actions and humanitarian assistance); see also 
Humanitarian Assistance to Victims of Natural Disasters and Similar Emergency Situa-
tions, G.A. Res. 43/131, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/131 (Dec. 8, 1988); Military and Paramili-
tary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 242 
(where the ICJ stated that “the provision of strictly humanitarian aid cannot be regarded 
as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international law”). 
 164. AP I, supra note 32, art. 54. See supra Obligation to Protect Objects Indispensa-
ble to the Survival of the Civilian Population, n. 79. 
 165. AP I, supra note 32, art. 70. It has been suggested that Articles 54 and 70 of AP I 
should be read together. See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 820, referred to in 
Fuel and Electricity Case, supra note 22, ¶ 14. 
 166. See Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 16, at 1162–65 which is also re-
ferred to in Fuel and Electricity Case, supra note 22, ¶ 14. 
 167. AP I, supra note 32, art. 70(1). 
 168. See id. arts. 59, 69(2), 71; GC IV, supra note 32, arts. 59–62, 108–11; see also 
ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, ¶ 2784. 
 169. Fuel and Electricity Case, supra note 22, ¶ 22. 
 170. Id. ¶¶ 13–15. 
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owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival” may not be re-
fused, and to the requisite consent of “the High Contracting Party con-
cerned” may be presumed in case of doubt over which are the authori-
ties.171 In light of the right to assistance under the principle of humanity, 
it is arguable that so long as the civilian population is inadequately sup-
plied and the party controlling the territory is unable to provide the nec-
essary assistance itself, it will have virtually little room to reject a pro-
posed relief operation.172 
As seen from the above list of obligations upon States, there are a 
number of existing norms of international humanitarian law relevant to 
the respect, protection, and provision of energy services to individuals 
affected by armed conflict. All these obligations point implicitly to the 
individual’s entitlement to energy as an indispensable means of survival, 
which must be duly recognized and protected. However, international 
humanitarian law has its inherent gaps and limitations. Although under-
pinned by principles of proportionality, humanity and the protection of 
persons hors de combat, as the law of war, it also seeks to protect mili-
tary necessity and accepts incidental or collateral damage. In contrast, 
these two recurrent exceptions do not exist in human rights law which, as 
will be shown below, further substantiates a case for the right to energy 
as a right that is applicable at all times. 
IV. ACCESS TO ENERGY AS A UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHT 
The Case for Human Rights 
Access to energy is a basic need of every human being, hence should 
be considered “part and parcel of human dignity which the state must 
respect, protect and fulfill unconditionally.”173 However, in view of the 
energy-related humanitarian disasters that occur in times of armed con-
flict, the current protection actually offered to the individual in this as-
pect is vastly inadequate and ineffective. It is therefore imperative to 
provide a better solution to the energy problem: by utilizing the potential 
                                                                                                                                     
 171. AP II, supra note 32, art. 18(2); see also ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, art. 
18(2), at 1479, ¶¶  4884–85. 
 172. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Humanitarian Assistance in Non-international 
Armed Conflict: The Fourth Wave of Rights, Duties and Remedies, 3 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. 
RTS. 183–217 (2001); S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0688 (Apr. 5, 1991) (demanding 
that Iraq allow humanitarian assistance by the international community to enter the coun-
try). 
 173. Eibe Riedel, The Human Right to Water and General Comment No. 15 of the 
CESCR, in THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER 19, 26 (Eibe Riedel & Peter Rothen eds., 2006). 
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of the existing international legal mechanism to the fullest.174 To this 
end, a human rights approach should serve to bridge any protection gaps. 
It has the “potential to achieve access to energy for all individuals,”175 by 
formally recognizing and operationalizing the basic need,176 imposing 
binding obligations on states to respect, protect and fulfill the right,177 as 
well as prescribing remedies for violations178 and leading to better com-
pliance.179 In a broad sense, it can also empower individuals by connect-
ing them to “the empowering potential of human rights.”180 
Access to Energy as an Implied Right 
As will be shown below, access to energy is an implied human right 
meaning that, although the major human rights instruments—like the 
provisions in IHL—are silent on the point, it is arguably an implicit at-
tribute of a number of human rights and underpins their practical realiza-
tion.181 This is apparent most notably in the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”) and the ICESCR,182 
as seen below. 
Preliminarily, the explicit reference to electricity in CEDAW under the 
right of women to adequate living conditions supports the case for the 
                                                                                                                                     
 174. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 414. 
 175. See generally Stephen Tully, The Human Right to Access Clean Energy, 3 J. 
GREEN BUILDING 140 (2008) [hereinafter Tully, Clean Energy]. 
 176. Id. at 143. 
 177. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 412. 
 178. See Melina Williams, Privatization and the Human Right to Water: Challenges 
for The New Century, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 469, 477–78 (2007) (pointing out that such a 
remedy is currently missing and potentially difficult to enforce). 
 179. Arguably, the creation of specific human rights norms will be more effective than 
reinforcing compliance with the existing rules of international humanitarian law, as socie-
ties that do not normally respect human rights in peacetime are less likely to respect in-
ternational humanitarian law during armed conflict. See Louise Doswald-Beck, Can Law 
Ensure Humanitarian Behaviour?, GLOBE, Spring 2010, at 10, 11. 
 180. CESCR Statement on Poverty, supra note 7, ¶ 6; see also Tully, Human Right to 
Access Electricity, supra note 7, at 143. 
 181. Tully, Clean Energy, supra note 175, at 140; see also Bradbrook & Gardam, su-
pra note 6, at 405; Tully, Human Right to Access Electricity, supra note 7, at 140. 
 182. Note that human rights codification is a “dynamic and evolving process,” in 
which silence of the instruments cannot preclude the subsequent development of specific 
human rights norms. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna 
Declaration and Program of Action, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993); 
CESCR, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Int’l Cov. on Econ., 
Soc. & Cultural Rights: The Right to Adequate Water, 29th Sess., Nov. 11–29,  2002, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter General Comment No. 15]; 
Riedel, supra note 173, at 23–24. 
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right to energy and its equal standing to the other related rights, such as 
the rights to adequate housing, water and sanitation, transport, and com-
munication.183 Likewise, as access to modern energy services is an essen-
tial component in the effective realization of many human rights under 
the ICESCR, the existence of this right is necessarily inferred. 184 
The Right to an Adequate Standing of Living 
The right to an adequate standing of living under the ICESCR185 by ex-
tension relates necessarily to “all of the economic, social, and cultural 
rights.”186 The express content of this right encompasses the rights to 
“adequate housing, food, clothing, and to the continuous improvement of 
living conditions.” 187  Therefore, energy is implicitly included in this 
nonexhaustive list.188 
The CESCR made it clear that the right to adequate housing includes 
as factors “sustainable access to natural and common resources, safe 
drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and 
washing facilities, means of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage 
and emergency services” that must be taken into account in determining 
whether the obligation is fulfilled.189 The UN Special Rapporteur on ade-
quate housing went further to state that the right includes “access to es-
                                                                                                                                     
 183. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
art. 14(2)(h), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S.13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
 184.  
Energy supports the provision of basic needs such as cooked food, a comforta-
ble living temperature, lighting, the use of appliances, piped water or sewerage, 
essential health care (refrigerated vaccines, emergency and intensive care), ed-
ucation aids, communication and transport. Energy also fuels productive activi-
ties, including agriculture, commerce, manufacture, industry, and mining. 
Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 393 (citing WEA 2000, supra note 9, at 3); WEA 
2000, supra note 9, at 44. See generally Brundtland Report, supra note 6; UNDP, Energy 
and Major Global Issues, in ENERGY AFTER RIO: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES § 2.1.1.1 
(1997). 
 185. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 11. Cf. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. 
Res. 217 (III) A, ¶ 25.1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 186. MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 292 (1995). 
 187. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 11(1). 
 188. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 408. 
 189. CESCR, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Int’l Cov. on 
Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights: The Right to Adequate Housing, ¶ 8(b), 5th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. E/1992/23 (Dec. 12, 1991) [hereinafter General Comment 4] (emphasis added). 
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sential civic services” such as “water, electricity and sanitation.”190 The 
right to adequate food, contained in the right to an adequate standard of 
living, imposes obligations of measures to “improve methods of produc-
tion, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of tech-
nical and scientific knowledge.”191 Additionally it requires parties to en-
sure that the food available is of sufficient quality to “satisfy the dietary 
needs of individuals” and be “free from adverse substances.”192 The fact 
that access to energy is needed to enhance food safety, protection, and 
preservation193  reinforces its implied existence as, in short, energy is 
“central to the satisfaction of basic nutrition and health needs,” and there-
fore underpins the right to adequate food.194 
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health 
Similarly, the right to health cannot be fully realized if there is no ac-
cess to energy services.195 From basic medical facilities and health ser-
vices to public hygiene, water, and sanitation systems, the health of every 
individual inevitably depends on the availability of energy services. The 
CESCR has recognized that the right to health depends upon “the realiza-
tion of other human rights” that address the right to health’s integral 
components.196 Arguably, the right to energy is one of these component 
rights. It is integral to ensuring that health services are “scientifically and 
medically appropriate and of good quality,” by powering hospital equip-
ment, systems for safe potable water, and for the provision of adequate 
                                                                                                                                     
 190. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing, The Realization of Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights, ESCOR, ¶ 99, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/12 
(July 12, 1995) (by Rajindar Sachar). 
 191. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 11(2)(a). 
 192. CESCRS, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Int’l Cov. on 
Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights: The Right to Adequate Food, ¶ 8, 20th Sess., Apr. 26–
May 14, 1999, U.N. Doc. E.C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) [hereinafter General Comment 
No. 12]. 
 193. Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra note 6, at 525. 
 194. Id. at 529 (citing UNDP, Energy After Rio: Prospects and Challenges, 12, U.N. 
Sales No. E.97.III.B.11 (1997)). This paper does not purport to discuss the right to ade-
quate clothing, since too little has been expressed on the right, whereas issues of housing 
and food suffice to illustrate the point made for energy in this case. 
 195. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 12; see also UDHR, supra note 185, art. 25. 
 196. CESCR, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Int’l Cov. on 
Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, ¶ 
3, 22d Sess., Apr. 25–May 12, 2000, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter General Comment No. 14]. 
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sanitation. 197  The strong link between access to energy services and 
health is further demonstrated in the armed conflict context, where the 
destruction of energy generating facilities has led to widespread health 
risks and humanitarian disasters.198 
The Right to Water 
Furthermore, the recently recognized human right to safe and clean 
drinking water further strengthens the case for the right to energy.199 Alt-
hough the right to water has gained more express recognition than that of 
energy,200 it is nevertheless the case that the “range of economic, social 
and cultural rights dependent upon access to modern energy services are 
‘considerably broader than those that require water.’”201 While access to 
water is considered to be “essential for the full enjoyment of life and all 
human rights”202 and “at least as important as food,”203 the right to water 
is “itself dependent upon a right to access to energy services.”204 Indeed, 
access to safe and clean drinking water itself more than often requires 
water pumps, desalination, and sanitation treatment—all of which require 
energy to function.205 In other words, following the recognition of the 
right to water, the consideration of recognition of the right to energy as 
an independent human right should only be a matter of time, but not of 
principle. 
                                                                                                                                     
 197. See General Comment No. 14, supra note 196, ¶¶ 12(d), 14–17 (where the 
CESCR expanded on the specific aspects of the right under Article 12(2), for which the 
access to energy is undoubtedly required). 
 198. See supra Energy as the Key to Survival in Armed Conflict, p. 582; see also Eliz-
abeth Gibbons & Richard Garfield, The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Health and 
Human Rights in Haiti, 1991-1994, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1499, 1501 (1999). 
 199. See General Comment No. 15, supra note 182. 
 200. For example, water is considered to have gained “explicit and enthusiastic support 
amongst civil society groups and international organisations” amongst “an ever-growing 
list of states,” as it was addressed in more concluding observations between 1993 and 
2006 than was energy. Riedel, supra note 173, at 19, 25. 
 201. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 409. 
 202. The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, G.A. Res. 64/292, at ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/64.292 (Aug. 3, 2010). 
 203. Riedel, supra note 173, at 25. 
 204. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 409. 
 205. Id. at 409; see also WATER UNDER SIEGE IN IRAQ, supra note 17, at 4; U.N. Pales-
tine Report, supra note 24, ¶ 1247. 
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The Right to Development206 
Energy is equally essential to economic and social development,207 
where development is a universal and inalienable right that facilitates the 
enjoyment of all human rights.208 It is the right to “participate in, contrib-
ute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural, and political development, in 
which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully real-
ized.”209 It is also seen as the right of all individuals to “maximize their 
potential, and to contribute to the evolution of society as a whole.”210 Yet 
its realization depends on the access to energy. Indeed, the UN Secretar-
General has spoken of energy as being “critical for human progress.”211 It 
has also been consistently acknowledged that without greater access to 
reliable and affordable energy services, none of the UN Millennium De-
velopment Goals (“MDGs”)212 can be achieved.213 
                                                                                                                                     
 206. The fact that the CESCR deliberately avoided the “deep waters of the right to 
development” in adopting General Comment No. 15 on the right to water arguably does 
not diminish the link between energy and development, which is necessarily stronger and 
more relevant than that in the case of water. See Riedel, supra note 173, at 28. 
 207. Agenda 21, supra note 10, ¶¶ 7.1, 7.46, 7.51. 
 208. Vienna Declaration, supra note 182, ¶ 10. 
 209. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986). 
 210. UNCHR, Question of the Realization in All Countries of the Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights Contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and Study of Special 
Problems Which the Developing Countries Face in Their Efforts to Achieve These Hu-
man Rights, para. 1, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/NGO/4 (Jan. 16, 1998); see also 
Vienna Declaration, supra note 182, ¶ 11; Agenda 21, supra note 10. But see, e.g., U.N. 
Conf. on Env’t & Dev., Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Action Taken by the Con-
ference, para. 16, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (Vol. IV) (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio 
Declaration]; Steven Marks, The Human Right to Development: between Rhetoric and 
Reality, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 137, 143–50 (2004); FELIX KIRCHMEIER, THE RIGHT TO 
DEVELOPMENT—WHERE DO WE STAND? 3, 9–10, 13–15 (Friedrich, Ebert, Stiftung 2006). 
 211. Asha-Rose Migiro, Deputy Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s remarks at 
UN Private Sector Forum on Sustainable Energy for All (Sept. 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=5530 (delivered on behalf of the U.N. 
Secretary-General). 
 212. U.N. Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 8, 
2000). 
 213. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 397 (citing WEA 2004, supra note 9, at 
18); Keeping the Promise: United to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals, G.A. 
Res. 1/65/L.1, para. 46, U.N. Doc. A/65/L.1 (Sept. 17, 2010) [hereinafter MDG Outcome 
Document]; see also Matters Brought to the Attention of the Council, Comm’n on Sus-
tainable Dev., 9th Sess., May 5, 2000, Apr. 16–27, 2001, paras. 1, 4, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.17/2001/19, Supp. No. 9 (2001); WSSD, Plan of Implementation, supra note 7, ¶ 
8; Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra note 6, at 531 (citing U.N. Millennium Project, 
Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development 
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One aspect of the right to development, sustainable development, also 
depends largely on the access to energy. 214 Defined by the UN as “de-
velopment that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
capability of future generations to meet their needs,”215 sustainable de-
velopment is “an important measure for the realisation of comprehensive 
and free development of people . . . through the best measures.”216 It 
concerns all areas of human development, of which access to energy is 
considered one of the major components, alongside the fulfilment of 
basic needs and poverty eradication.217 As an underlying condition for 
the latter two, access to energy is arguably the biggest key to realizing 
sustainable development and hence should be considered a right in it-
self.218 
Emerging International Recognition and State Practice 
In light of the essential role of energy in the realization of the rights 
examined above, the right to energy is already integral to the existing 
human rights framework.219 The growing international recognition of the 
link between access to energy and human development, as evidenced in 
the practice of states and the international community, makes the case for 
formal recognition of the right to energy even more compelling. For dec-
ades, human development and environmental protection have been wide-
                                                                                                                                     
Goals 140 (2005)). See generally KANDEH K. YMKELLA ET AL., UN–ENERGY: LOOKING 
TO THE FUTURE 8 (Apr. 2010), 
http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/News/2010/UN-
Energy_Looking_to_the_Future.pdf. 
 214. See Xigen Wang, On the Right to Sustainable Development: Foundation in Legal 
Philosophy and Legislative Proposal, in IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: 
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39, 45 (Stephen P. Marks ed., 2008). 
 215. See Brundtland Report, supra note 6; Wang, supra note 214, at 40. 
 216. Wang, supra note 214, at 45. 
 217. UNDP, ENERGY AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Thom-
as B. Johansson et al. eds., 1995); Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra note 6, at 518–
48; see ESCOR, Comm’n on Sustainable Dev., Rep. on the Ninth Session, § II, ¶ 4, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.17/2001/19 (2001). 
 218. See also Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 409. 
 219. For example, it has also been argued that the right to energy is essential to the 
realization of multiple rights under the ICESCR including: the right to work (Art. 6), the 
right to safe and healthy working conditions (Art. 7) and the right to education (Art. 13), 
as well as the right to equality and non-discrimination (Arts. 2(2), 3), the discussion of 
which, due to space constraints, has to be left out of this paper. ICESCR, supra note 50; 
see Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 406; Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra 
note 6, at 525; Tully, Human Right to Access Electricity, supra note 7. 
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ly discussed among states in the international arena.220 For example, the 
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development resulted in the 
extremely detailed Agenda 21,221 Rio Declaration,222 and Statement of 
Principles.223 The Energy Charter Treaty of 1994,224 the first international 
multilateral treaty concerned exclusively with energy services, seeks to 
promote energy efficiency and attempts to minimize the environmental 
impact of energy production and use at every stage of the energy 
chain.225 
In 2000, one of the MDGs set by the United Nations was to ensure en-
vironmental sustainability.226 The World Energy Assessment Report of 
2000 and its 2004 Update227 were considered “a major milestone in [the] 
                                                                                                                                     
 220. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 397–98; see also Brundtland Report, su-
pra note 6, ch. 4; see Econ. & Soc. Comm’n for Asia & the Pacific, Gov’t of the Rep. of 
Indon., Bali, Indon., Dec. 9–10, 2008, High-level Regional Policy Dialogue on “The 
food-fuel crisis and climate change: Reshaping the Development Agenda”, ¶¶ 19, 20, 23 
(2008), available at http://www.unescap.org/LDCCU/Meetings/HighLevel-RPD-food-
fuel-crisis/BaliOutcomeDocument.pdf; ENERGY 2010, 
http://www.energyafricaexpo.com/index.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2012); Council Di-
rective 2003/54, art. 3(3), 2003 O.J. (L 176) 37, 43 (EC) (explaining there is a state obli-
gation to “ensure that all household customers . . . enjoy universal service, that is, the 
right to be supplied with electricity of a specified quality within their territory at reasona-
ble, easily and clearly comparable and transparent prices.”). 
 221. See Agenda 21, supra note 10, ¶¶ 7.1–7.8. 
 222. Rio Declaration, supra note 210, princs. 1–5. 
 223. U.N. Conf. on Env. & Dev., Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Non-legally 
Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Manage-
ment, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. III), Annex III (Aug. 14, 1992). 
 224. Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy Charter Treaty and Related Documents, 
Final Act of the Int’l Conf. and Dec. of the Energy Charter Conf. (1991), available at 
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf [hereinafter Energy 
Charter Treaty]; see also Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy Charter Treaty and 
Related Documents, Concluding Doc. of the Hague Conf. on the Eur. Energy Charter 
(1991), available at http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf. 
 225. Clare Shine, Environmental Protection Under the Energy Charter Treaty, in THE 
ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: AN EAST-WEST GATEWAY FOR INVESTMENT AND TRADE 520, 
544 (Thomas W. Wälde ed., 1996). Note particularly Article 19 of the Energy charter 
Treaty for the numerous references to economically efficient and environmentally sound 
energy technologies and development of renewable energy sources. Energy Charter Trea-
ty, supra note 224, art. 19(d), (g). 
 226. U.N. Millennium Declaration, supra note 212, para. IV; see also Agenda 21, su-
pra note 10, princs. 1, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15; ¶¶ 5.3, 7.27, 7.28, 7.35, 7.39, 7.41, 18.3, 18.8, 
18.35, 18.40, 18.48, 18.50, 18.59, 18.68. 
 227. WEA 2000, supra note 9; UNDP ET. AL., WORLD ENERGY ASSESSMENT 
OVERVIEW: 2004 UPDATE, U.N. Sales No. E.04.III.B.6 (Jose Goldemberg & Thomas B. 
Johansson eds., 2004).  
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effort . . . of the United Nations [and] the first time that energy issues 
were considered in their totality in the context of sustainable develop-
ment.”228 Leading up to the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Devel-
opment (“WSSD”), which marked the tenth anniversary of the Rio Con-
ference, energy was placed alongside water, health, agriculture, and bio-
diversity as one of the key areas “in which progress would offer all hu-
man beings a chance of achieving prosperity” beyond their own life-
time.229 In the WSSD that followed, the energy issue was substantially 
discussed. Against the background of the energy-poverty nexus and the 
role of energy access in food, water, health, income, and jobs, energy 
services were regarded as “an entry point to sustainable development,” 
and the importance of energy conservation, efficiency, and the need to 
develop clean and renewable energy sources to mitigate climate change 
were highlighted.230 More specifically, states have undertaken to develop 
“advanced, cleaner, more efficient, affordable and cost-effective energy 
technologies” and “substantially increase the global share of renewable 
energy sources with the objective of increasing its contribution to total 
energy supply,”231  as well as to improve access to affordable, “cost-
effective, safe and environmentally sound alternatives to ozone-depleting 
substances.”232 
Most recently, equal access to energy has been specifically mentioned 
alongside health, education, water, and sanitation as one of the means to 
accelerate progress to achieve the MDG of ensuring environmental sus-
tainability.233 In addition, references were made to the increased use of 
new and renewable energy sources, “sustainable use of traditional energy 
resources,” as well as the promotion of “access to modern, reliable, af-
fordable and sustainable energy services” by way of national policies and 
international cooperation.234 For the upcoming Earth Summit 2012, the 
                                                                                                                                     
 228. See Kui-Nang Mak & Friedrich Soltau, Policy Options, in THE LAW OF ENERGY 
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 202, 206 (Adrian J. Bradbrook et al. eds., 2005). 
 229. Press Release, Secretary General, Both Rich and Poor Have Clear Interest in Pro-
tecting Environment, Promoting Sustainable Development, Secretary-General Says, U.N. 
Press Release SG/SM/8239 (May 14, 2002). 
 230. World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, S. Afr., Aug. 26–
Sept. 4, 2002, Rep. of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, ¶¶ 39–44, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (2002). 
 231. WSSD, Plan of Implementation, supra note 7, ¶¶ 8, 19(e). 
 232. Id. ¶¶ 8, 37(d). 
 233. MDG Outcome Document, supra note 213, para. 77(k). 
 234. Id. para. 77(f). 
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global energy crisis has been highlighted as one of the more urgent prob-
lems up for discussion.235 
While no international initiative can change the world overnight and 
few can be considered extremely effective,236 the continuous efforts of 
the international community in implementing strategic programmes in 
energy access, renewable energy, and energy efficiency ought to be 
acknowledged and appreciated.237 At the very least, these reflect the on-
going commitment of the international community to move the world 
toward universal access to energy services, poverty eradication, and sus-
tainable development, all of which establish a framework for the right to 
energy as a human right. Further support for the right to energy can be 
found in the practice of individual states and certain Concluding Obser-
vations of the ICESCR. Taking South Africa as an example, the right to 
access electricity services was considered by its Constitutional Court to 
be included in the right to adequate housing,238 whereas the South Afri-
can High Court found a prima facie right to demand electricity once the 
supply condition is satisfied. 239  In its Concluding Observations, the 
CESCR urged Georgia to particularly ensure that the infrastructure for 
“energy provision and heating” is improved,240 and called on Australia to 
“take immediate steps to [implement] a human rights framework that 
ensures access to the social determinants of health such as . . . electrici-
ty.”241 It has also expressed its deep concern towards the “continuing 
lower standard of living of Israeli Arabs as a result, inter alia, of . . . lack 
                                                                                                                                     
 235. Addressing New and Emerging Challenges, EARTH SUMMIT, 
http://www.earthsummit2012.org/index.php/addressing-new-emerging-challenges (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2012). 
 236. See, e.g., George Pring, The 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable 
Development: International Environment Law Collides With Reality, Turning Jo’Burg 
Into ‘Joke’Burg’, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 410, 420 (2002). 
 237. See U.N. Industrial Dev. Org. [UNIDO], Delivering on Energy: An overview of 
activities by UN-Energy and its members (2010), available at 
http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/News/2010/Delivering_on_Energy.PDF. 
 238. Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 
para 37 (S. Afr.); S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, §26; see also Jackie Dugard, Power to the 
people? A rights-based Analysis of South Africa’s electricity services, in ELECTRIC 
CAPITALISM: RECOLONISING AFRICA ON THE POWER GRID 264, 266 (2009). Note that alt-
hough it was an obiter dictum and South African has not ratified the ICESCR, that should 
not negate the judicial recognition of the importance of access to energy services. 
 239. See Meyer v. Moqhaka Local Municipality 2004 (4008/2003) [2004] ZAFSHC 
122 (S. Afr.). 
 240. ESCOR, Concluding Observations of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural 
Rights: Geor., ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.83 (Dec. 19, 2002). 
 241. ESCOR, Concluding Observations of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural 
Rights: Austl., ¶ 28 U.N. Doc. E/C.12/AUS/CO/4 (June 12, 2009). 
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of access to . . . electricity.”242 In view of this growing legal basis, there 
appears little justification for not recognizing access to energy as a hu-
man right. 
V. THE NORMATIVE CONTENT OF THE RIGHT TO ENERGY 
General Definition 
The human right to energy should be defined as a universal right of 
“access to the products and lifestyle changes that the availablility of ade-
quate modern energy services can provide.”243 Without proposing a de-
tailed formulation of the right, it is suggested that at least three basic el-
ements be present: availability, accessibility, and quality.244 Availability 
entails adequacy, regularity, continuity, and reliability. The supply of 
energy services must be able to meet the most pressing needs for human 
survival, such as cooking, lighting, refrigeration, and maintenance of es-
sential medical services. Arbitrary disconnections from “the essential 
minimum quantity of electricity for reasons of financial inability” should 
be prohibited.245 Accessibility means that energy services must be pro-
vided on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis.246 It presupposes both 
physical, economic, and information accessibility: the services must be 
accessible in proximity to the population, the costs must be affordable, 
and information concerning energy issues should be freely accessible by 
the general population.247 This is especially important in ensuring access 
for vulnerable and underprivileged groups, which are often doubly mar-
                                                                                                                                     
 242. ESCOR, Concluding Observations of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural 
Rights: Isr., ¶ 16, U.N. Doc.E/C.12/1/Add.90 (June 26, 2003). 
 243. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 392–93 (citing Klais Bosselman, Ethical 
Implications of Energy for Sustainable Development, in THE LAW OF ENERGY, supra note 
228, ch. 5). 
 244. See, e.g., General Comment No. 15, supra note 182, ¶ 12; Bradbrook & Gardam, 
supra note 6, at 409; Tully, Human Right to Access Electricity, supra note 7, at 32. 
 245. Tully, Human Right to Access Electricity, supra note 7, at 33. 
 246. ICESCR, supra note 50, arts. 2(2), 3; CESCR, Rep. on the Tenth & Eleventh 
Sessions, May 2–20, 1994, Nov. 21–Dec. 9, 1994, Supp. No. 3, Annex IV, General 
Comment No. 5, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/1995/22 (1995) [hereinafter General Comment No. 
5]; CESCR, General Comment No. 16, The Equal Right of Men and Women to the En-
joyment of All Econ. Soc. & Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2005/4 (Aug. 12, 2005) 
[hereinafter General Comment No. 16]; CESCR, General Comment No. 20, Non-
Discrimination in Econ. Soc. & Cultural Rights, U.N. E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009) [here-
inafter General Comment No. 20]. 
 247. For discussions on possible subsidies, see George R. G. Clarke & Scott Wallsten, 
Universal Service: Empirical Evidence on the Provision of Infrastructure Services to the 
Rural and Poor Urban Consumers, in INFRASTRUCTURE FOR POOR PEOPLE: PUBLIC 
POLICY FOR PRIVATE PROVISION 21–75 (Penelope Brook & Timothy Irwin eds., 2003). 
616 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:2 
ginalized by the lack of energy access.248 Quality generally refers to safe-
ty. The energy sources involved should not be harmful to human health 
or the environment and, ideally, clean and environmentally friendly. 
Specificity in the Context of Development249 
In light of the energy crises facing the world today, it is inevitable that 
that the right to energy should be tied to wider development goals.250 In 
other words, the manner of realizing the right to energy must also be sus-
tainable, ensuring that the right can be realized for present and future 
generations.251 This recognizes the pressing need to resolve the underly-
ing incompatibility between expanding energy access by exploiting natu-
ral resources and the related environmental objectives.252 Today, in the 
name of development, the continued increase in the unsustainable use of 
nonrenewable energy sources, such as coal, oil, and natural gas, by an 
expanding global population are generating environmental problems that 
will in turn undermine human development.253 Thus it is suggested that 
all energy sources used should, as far as practicable, be clean, renewable, 
and “used in ways that respect the atmosphere, human health and the en-
vironment as a whole.”254 This will ensure that energy, as a right, is not 
subject to limitations caused by unsustainable practices in the future. 
                                                                                                                                     
 248. Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra note 6, at 520; U.N. Conf. on Trade & 
Dev., Feb. 4–8, 2002, Analysis of Ways to Enhance the Contribution of Specific Services 
Sectors to the Development Perspectives of Developing Countries: Energy Services in 
International Trade: Development Implications, §1, ¶¶ 2, 3, 5 & § 2, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
TD/B/COM.1/L.22 (Feb. 7, 2002). 
 249. It is noted that the CESCR was “not that bold” to raise the issue of environmental 
protection in its General Comment on the right to water, in view of “the breath of the 
environmental aspects” of water and the protection of water resources by the right to 
health, under the heading of “improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial 
hygiene.” See General Comment No. 15, supra note 182; Riedel, supra note 173, at 28; 
ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 12(2)(b). However, it is argued that the right to health, given 
its nature and limited scope, will not be sufficient to cover the range of environmental 
issues associated with realization of universal energy access that go beyond human 
health, environmental, and industrial hygiene, such as the overexploitation of natural 
resources and its impact on the sustainability of energy sources and services. 
 250. ESCOR, Comm’n on Sci. & Tech. for Dev., New and Emerging Technologies: 
Renewable Energy for Development: Rep. of the Secretary General, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.16/2010/4 (Mar. 8, 2010). 
 251. Cf. General Comment No. 15, supra note 182, ¶ 11. 
 252. Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra note 6, at 545; see also Int’l Conf. for 
Renewable Energies, Bonn, Germ., June 1–4, 2004, Political Declaration, ¶ 1 (2004), 
available at http://www.renewables2004.de/pdf/conference_report.pdf. 
 253. Agenda 21, supra note 10, ch. 6. 
 254. Id. ¶ 9.9; see also Tully, Clean Energy, supra note 175, at 140–48. 
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VI. THE LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 
Non-derogable Core Obligations and Progressive Realization 
Before considering the human rights obligations pertaining to the right 
to energy, it should first be recalled that in international human rights 
law, the right to energy has been regarded as an implied right under the 
ICESCR. Hence, the general obligations under the ICESCR serve as a 
useful starting point to examine the relevant obligations flowing from the 
right to energy. First, it is argued that the non-derogable minimum core 
obligations in times of armed conflict, emergency, and natural disasters 
under the ICESCR255 should apply. Another feature is arguably non-
derogable nature of the right since, unlike the ICCPR,256 the ICESCR 
contains no express provision for derogations.257 It only permits states to 
“subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law 
only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights 
and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a demo-
cratic society.”258 This is a very restrictive provision since jeopardizing 
the essential human needs for energy would not be compatible with the 
nature of the right nor would it promote “the general welfare in a demo-
cratic society.”259 
Also applicable is the principle of progressive realization contained in 
the ICESCR, which requires all states parties to make every effort to 
“ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels” of 
the right to energy on a nondiscriminatory basis,260 while moving “as 
expeditiously and effectively as possible” towards its full realization by 
“all appropriate means.”261 This principle acknowledges the possible re-
                                                                                                                                     
 255. See CESCR Statement on Poverty, supra note 7, ¶¶ 16, 18; Vienna Declaration, 
supra note 182, ¶ 29. See generally Amrei Müller, Limitations to and Derogations from 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 557, 557–601 (2009). Cf. 
General Comment No. 15, supra note 182, ¶¶ 22, 37, 40; General Comment No. 14, su-
pra note 196, ¶ 47. 
 256. ICCPR, supra note 49, art. 4. 
 257. See Wall Opinion, supra note 40, ¶¶ 106, 135 (where the ICJ considered that 
derogations should be justified by express provisions). 
 258. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 4 (emphasis added); see also Wall Opinion, supra 
note 40, ¶ 136 (where the ICJ held that the construction of the wall by Israel fails to meet 
these conditions). 
 259. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 4. 
 260. Id. arts. 2(2), 3; see also General Comment No. 20, supra note 246. 
 261. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 2(1); see also CESCRS, General Comment No. 3: 
The Nature of States Parties Obligations, ¶¶ 9–10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) 
[hereinafter General Comment No. 3]. 
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source constraints faced by states,262 the time needed to incrementally 
expand the network of energy services provisioned to benefit the entire 
population,263 while also implicitly addressing the risks of destruction of 
energy infrastructures in armed conflict.264 It further obliges states to 
seek and provide international assistance and cooperation, in particular 
economic and technical, where necessary.265 
It is therefore well settled that in all circumstances, states must take 
immediate, deliberate, and concrete steps, “to the maximum of its availa-
ble resources,” to ensure that the energy services provided can meet the 
survival needs of the population or, at least, “the widest possible” part of 
it.266 Any inaction or retrogressive measures towards fully realizing the 
right can hardly be justified, save on truly exceptional grounds and sup-
ported by cogent evidence.267 
Obligation to Respect, Protect, and Fulfill 
More specifically, states are obliged to respect, protect, and fulfill the 
right to energy.268 To respect the right is to refrain from violating it. This 
entails the avoidance of actions that can deprive any right-holder of his 
or her equitable access to energy services, including measures to termi-
nate the service provisions, embargos, and sanctions that have dispropor-
tionate impacts on the population’s access to such services.269 To protect 
is to take necessary measures to prevent violations by third parties, such 
as private energy providers and other non-state actors.270 It should be 
added that mere privatization of the energy services provision does not 
                                                                                                                                     
 262. General Comment No. 3, supra note 261, ¶ 10. 
 263. Tully, Human Right to Access Electricity, supra note 7, at 32. 
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absolve states parties from their human rights obligations.271 The obliga-
tion to fulfill is the taking of targeted, positive actions on part of the par-
ties to facilitate, promote, and provide access to energy services to all 
individual within their jurisdiction or control, including implementing 
appropriate laws and policies, where necessary, to achieve universal and 
equitable access, with specific measures to ensure the inclusion of vul-
nerable groups in society.272 
This obligation should also entail the taking of necessary steps to pro-
mote, as suggested in a recent review of the MDG for environmental sus-
tainability, the “increased use of new and renewable energy sources,”273 
energy efficiency, increasing the “sustainable use of traditional energy 
resources,” “promoting access to modern, reliable, affordable and sus-
tainable energy services,” as well as the transfer of affordable sustainable 
energy technologies by international cooperation.274 In short, it is the ob-
ligation to reduce the society’s dependency on fossil fuel275 and increase 
reliance on environmentally sound energy systems in order to ensure sus-
tainable energy supply for sustainable human development.276 
Of specific relevance to the realization of the right to energy access is 
the obligation to seek and provide international assistance and coopera-
tion, where necessary, to advance local energy technologies.277 A majori-
ty of the world’s most deprived regions have limited means to benefit 
from the new, privileged energy technologies,278 even though, contrary to 
common perception, some of these technologies are potentially afforda-
ble279 and have high potential in some of the developing countries, such 
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as solar energy in Africa.280 Moreover, this obligation arguably coincides 
with the right to “enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applica-
tions,”281 which requires steps to be taken for, inter alia, the “develop-
ment and the diffusion of science”282 and encourages international con-
tacts and cooperation.283 In response to various claims that this right di-
rectly clashes with intellectual property rights, it has been specifically 
and eloquently argued that according to the proper interpretation of this 
right, intellectual property rights do not constitute a barrier to the de-
ployment, diffusion, and transfer of new technological discoveries, such 
as low carbon and adaptation technologies.284 Therefore, it is posited that 
the obligation to develop energy technologies no longer rests upon each 
individual state within its own territory, but is spread across the interna-
tional community as a whole, in a global effort to pursue universal ener-
gy services. 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
To conclude, access to energy services is a universal human right of 
both the present and future generations, applicable both at peacetime and 
in armed conflict. An essential right for human development at peace-
time, and a key to human survival in armed conflict, it is a right that 
ought to be formally recognized and protected for all individuals, at all 
times, in all places. First regarded as an implicit attribute of pre-existing 
human rights and obligations under international humanitarian law, the 
right to energy, in view of the emerging international recognition, now 
deserves its own status as a freestanding human right. 
This paper calls for timely recognition of the right within the existing 
legal framework in order to ensure better protection. This can be accom-
plished by setting out detailed obligations, holding violators accountable, 
and providing appropriate remedies. This may take the form of a General 
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Comment to be issued by the CESCR,285 an express inclusion of the en-
ergy access in the current Reporting Guidelines,286 a set of specifically 
tailored voluntary guidelines, 287  or a multilateral treaty. 288  After all, 
merely calling something a human right will not achieve much.289 Plac-
ing energy in a human rights framework is only the beginning—a prel-
ude to finding the right solution to sustainable human development 
amidst the global energy crises today and the impacts of armed conflict 
on the human life. “What matters in the end is that human rights are ef-
fectively realized and that is a political and legal issue at the same 
time.”290 
This Article represents a preliminary attempt to address and explore 
some of the issues involved in this relatively new area of energy and hu-
man rights. Now it would be incumbent upon the international communi-
ty to keep the energy question alive by developing it further in the main-
stream agenda. 291 Questions remain as to how to realize this right in a 
sustainable development context without compromising other human 
rights292 and how to best protect the right in armed conflict in light of 
military necessity under international humanitarian law. Lastly, when 
advocating for the new right to energy, one should always keep in mind 
what the right truly involves, at whose cost, at whose gain, and most im-
portantly, the underlying reasons why it deserves universal respect and 
protection. Many issues raised in this paper invite further research, 
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recognition, and reflections, all of which ought to be considered with the 
universality of human rights and the reverence for humanity in mind. 
Only then can this human right go beyond the narcissist’s rhetoric293 to 
offer real protection for human life and dignity, wherever and whenever. 
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